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Qualified privilege in defamation and the 
evolution of the doctrine of reportage 
Sarah Gale* 
This article looks at the evolution of the doctrine of reportage, which has 
emerged as a sub-species of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 
AC 127 qualified privilege as a defence to defamation in English law. It 
argues that the relationship between these two types of qualified privilege is 
an uneasy one because although they have some features in common, the 
emphasis in reportage on the neutral reporting of disputes is quite distinct 
from Reynolds. The Defamation Act 2013 (UK) does codify the defence to 
some extent but ignores this complex relationship. There is, however, scope 
for a limited form of the reportage in situations where the Reynolds defence 
would not be available. 
<DIV>INTRODUCTION 
In Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd,1 the House of Lords ruled that there was a special type of 
defence of qualified privilege for the media in defamation cases where they had engaged in 
investigative journalism. Qualified privilege is described aptly by Smith J in Al-Fagih v HH Saudi 
Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd as “a limited right to publish with impunity untrue defamatory 
matter”.2 
At common law, that right is limited by the need to meet the standards of responsible journalism by 
showing overall that the story is in the public interest. Precisely how the new public interest defence3 
in the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) (the Act) will be viewed by the courts remains to be seen. The 
emphasis in Reynolds was on meeting a threshold of responsible journalism rather than on focusing 
on a test based on reciprocal interests and duties, laid down in other cases on common law qualified 
privilege in non-media situations such as Kearns v Bar Council.4 
This article will examine how reportage has evolved as a sub-species of Reynolds5 qualified privilege 
and how the two defences differ.6 It will also analyse the scope of the Reynolds defence and whether 
it is, or should be, limited to investigative journalism. Although both types of qualified privilege have 
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1
 Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. 
2
 Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2000] WL 1675201 at [48]. 
3
 Lord Phillips in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [27] said that the term “privilege is 
misleading” as a description of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 privilege. It should be described as a 
“public interest defence”.  
4
 Kearns v Bar Council [2003] 1 WLR 1357; [2003] EWCA Civ 331. 
5
 For analysis of Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 and Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) 
[2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 at [50], see: Loveland I, “A New Legal Landscape? Libel Law and Freedom of Political 
Expression in the United Kingdom” (2000) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 476; Cram I, “Political Expression, 
Qualified Privilege and Investigative Journalism – an Analysis of Developments in English Defamation Law Post Reynolds v 
Times Newspapers” (2005) 11 Canterbury Law Review 143; Coad J, “Reynolds and the Public Interest” (2007) 18 
Entertainment Law Review 5; Rowbottom J, “Libel and the Public Interest” (2007) 66 Cambridge Law Journal 8; Bonnington 
A, “Reynolds Rides Again” (2006) 11 Communications Law 147; Hooper D, “The Importance of the Jameel Case” (2007) 18 
Entertainment Law Review 62.  
6
 Reportage is described by Lord Phillips in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [35], as“a 
special kind of responsible journalism with distinctive features of its own”. 
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been argued in many of the cases analysed below, it is clear that the reportage defence is necessarily 
more limited covering “reports” rather than investigative pieces. It will also be argued that the precise 
nature of their inter-relationship is complex.7 The Act,8 which places the two in the same section, 
confirms that reportage is indeed a sub-species of Reynolds qualified privilege.9 How, and to what 
extent, courts will refer to earlier case law remains unclear as it is debatable whether the case law on 
both Reynolds and reportage is indeed reflected in the new public interest defence. 
The author will argue that there is an obvious need for a limited form of the reportage defence given 
the uncertainty, difficulties and expense of arguing Reynolds qualified privilege successfully10 even 
though this might result in the publication of untrue defamatory material. Only large media 
organisations are likely to have the funds to mount a Reynolds defence.11 These difficulties are 
evidenced by the lack of case law and by the very few cases that have reached the Supreme Court.12 
Reportage and Reynolds tend to be argued together or in the alternative, which is no less complicated 
than arguing Reynolds alone. However, s 4 of the Act attempts to draw a distinction between the two 
and so arguing pure reportage might become easier in the future. It is clear, however, that their 
foundations are the same. 
<DIV>FOUNDATION OF THIS TYPE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE  
Analyses of this type of qualified privilege tend to begin with Lord Nicholls’ judgment in Reynolds.14 
His Lordship laid down the criteria to be met by responsible journalists with reference to Arts 10 (the 
right to freedom of expression) and 8 (the right to respect for privacy which includes the right to 
reputation) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ETS 5; 
213 UNTS 221 (ECHR) motivated by the desire to ensure that English defamation law was ECHR-
compliant before the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).  
The European Court of Human Rights (the Strasbourg Court) confirmed in Pfeifer v Austria ,15 that 
Art 8 of the ECHR encompassed a right to protection of reputation as part of the right to respect for 
private life. The Strasbourg Court held in White v Sweden16 that it should balance the interests 
protected by Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR17 against one another in cases involving the right to 
protection of reputation as against preventing the publication of allegedly defamatory statements in 
 
7
 Roberts v Gable [2008] 2 WLR 129; [2007] EWCA Civ 721 at [40] (Ward LJ). 
8
 Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 4 is entitled “Publication on matters of public interest”.  
9
 Lord Lester suggested that there was no longer any need for a separate defence of reportage because it was already covered by 
the new public interest defence: see United Kingdom, Hansard, House of Lords, 5 February 2013, vol 743 at col 195 (Lord 
Lester), www.parliament.uk/business/publications/hansard/. 
10
 Mark Stephens, in his evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, estimated the cost 
of running a Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 defence at somewhere between £100,000 and £200,000: see 
United Kingdom, House of Commons Public Bill Committee: Defamation Bill PBC (Bill 005) 2012-13, 19 June 2012 at [66] 
(Robert Flello MP), www.parliament.uk/business/committees. 
11
 It is doubtful whether or not the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) will change this very much. 
12
 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 is the latest case although reportage was not an issue in 
the Supreme Court. The lack of cases might be due to lower courts taking a cautious approach to Lord Nicholls’ criteria in 
Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127. The Reynolds defence only succeeded in the Supreme Court in Flood and 
Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 which is further evidence of its complex 
nature. 
14
 See also Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 4; Polanco Torres v Movilla Polanco v Spain [2010] ECHR 1341, where the 
Strasbourg Court examined Reynolds-like criteria on responsible journalism before concluding that the media as a public 
watchdog should have a special place in any democratic society and that freedom of expression should not be constrained 
without good reason.  
15
 Pfeifer v Austria  (2007) 48 EHRR 175; [2007] ECHR 935 at [35]. 
16
 White v Sweden (2008) 46 EHRR 3; [2006] ECHR 793 at [19], [30]. See Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia AS v Slovakia 
(No 3) [2014] ECHR 9 at [77]. 
17
 The Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 defence is said to promote “greater freedom for the press to publish 
stories of genuine public interest” according to Lord Brown in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 
11 at [118]. 
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newspapers.18 These concerns are reflected In Henry v British Broadcasting Corporation19 and in 
academic literature.20 
Whilst the basis for the defence and the desire to strike the correct balance between Arts 8 and 10 of 
the ECHR might be clear,21 the law of defamation has still had to adapt to encompass the Reynolds 
and reportage defences with a view to meeting those concerns, a key aim in the new legislation. 
Parliament seemed worried about the costs of running a Reynolds-type defence22 and in particular the 
difficulties of arguing Lord Nicholls’ criteria.  
Despite the ruling in Jameel v Wall Street Journal SPRL (No 3),23 lower courts tended to view the 
criteria as a series of hurdles.24 Whilst the criteria might have had the advantage of clarity, Parliament 
was keen to find ways of establishing a public interest defence that allowed the courts to look at all 
the circumstances of the case.25 Section 4 of the Act abolishes Lord Nicholls’ list by attempting to 
improve upon Reynolds, to be more ECHR-compliant and to take account of Flood v Times 
Newspapers Ltd.26 The Act is intended to draw upon a well-worn theme emphasised by the Supreme 
Court in Flood that the press should be free to publish stories of genuine public interest. This begs 
questions about the scope of the defence.  
<subdiv>Scope of Reynolds 
Reportage or neutral reportage as opposed to Reynolds (which covered investigative journalism) is 
when a journalist reports both sides of a story, which is of legitimate and topical interest to its readers, 
without embellishing or adopting it as his or her own. The reportage defence has evolved as a sub-
species of the Reynolds qualified privilege defence available to responsible journalists in situations 
where Reynolds might not apply although the foundation on which they are based is similar. 
It was always assumed that Reynolds qualified privilege (and by extension reportage) only covered 
the media27 until Seaga v Harper28 where Lord Carswell held that Reynolds qualified privilege could 
extend to any type of publication that satisfied the tests of public interest and responsible journalism. 
This controversial proposition was upheld by Eady J in Seray-Wurie v Charity Commission.29,Llater 
 
18
 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221 (ECHR), Art 10(2) 
provides that the right to freedom of expression may be subject to restrictions “for the protection of the reputation or rights of 
others”. In Polanco Torres v Movilla Polanco v Spain [2010] ECHR 1341; Kania & Kittel v Poland [2011] ECHR 978 at [36], 
[40], the Strasbourg  Ccourt found that freedom of expression carried “duties and responsibilities” and that journalists had to 
act “in good faith“ so as to provide “accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism”. The test of 
“necessity in a democratic society” (in Art 10 of the ECHR) meant considering whether the interference with freedom of 
expression corresponded to a “pressing social need”.  
19
 Henry v British Broadcasting Corporation [2005] EWHC 2787 at [81]. 
20
 Barendt E, “Balancing Freedom of Expression and Privacy: The Jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court” (2009) 1 Journal of 
Media Law 49; Mullis A and Scott A: “The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and the Re-Centring of English 
Libel Law” (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 27. 
21
 In Affaire Axel Springer AG v Allemagne (No 2) [2014] ECHR 745 at [56], the court found that both articles should be given 
equal weight.  
22
 See text around n  10 
23
 Jameel v Wall Street Journal SPRL (No 3) (2007) 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 at [50]. 
24
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Defamation Bill Report, HL Paper 86 (December 2012) at [10]. 
25
 Tomlinson H, Case Law: Flood v Times Newspapers, Supreme Court Allows “Reynolds” Appeal, The International Forum 
for Responsible Media Blog (21 March 2012), https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2012/03/21/case-law-flood-v-times-newspapers-
supreme-court-allows-reynolds-appeal-hugh-tomlinson-qc/. 
26
 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11. 
27
 See also Lord Phillips in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [44] where his Lordship said 
that although Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 was not the exclusive preserve of the media, they were the 
more likely to rely upon it as they would publish to the whole world more often. 
28
 Seaga v Harper  [2008] 3 WLR 478; [2008] UKPC 9 at [11]. 
29
 Seray-Wurie v Charity Commission [2008] EWHC 870. 
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courts have not however taken this position.30 There are conceptual difficulties in applying Reynolds 
to non-media publications as it would be difficult to work out the relative standards of responsible 
conduct. The Reynolds defence seems aimed specifically at investigative journalism and was not 
therefore designed to cover other authors, such as bloggers.31 Presumably a blogger would not have 
the resources to carry out investigative journalism and should not therefore be judged by the same 
standards.32 It might also be rather difficult to work out an appropriate objective standard by which to 
judge a blogger as they are so varied in background and expertise. Nor is there a requirement that they 
conform to a professional standard of behaviour or ethical code.33  
This theory would seem to be borne out by the case law on breach of duty in negligence.34 Whilst 
learner drivers are judged by an objective standard of reasonable competency for policy reasons35 and 
doctors (and other professionals) are generally judged by the standard of accepted professional 
opinion,36 a jeweller who pierces your ears is not expected to have the same skills as a surgeon or to 
meet the same standards of hygiene as a hospital.37 This suggests that a blogger would be judged by 
the standard of a reasonably competent blogger (if such a person were capable of existing) rather than 
by the same standard as an investigative journalist as the expertise, resources and infrastructure 
available to them are far greater than those available to most bloggers. Nor would most bloggers have 
the funds to defend a case38 arguing Reynolds and/or reportage qualified privilege, although reportage 
alone should be more straightforward.  
The Act might, however, change things radically as it seems designed to apply to any author.39 Surely 
it would still exclude sloppy journalism but will require consideration of the difficulties of finding the 
appropriate standard bearing in mind the need to balance Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR. 
This article will look in particular at freedom of speech.40 This will be seen against a background of 
political disputes which are viewed generally by the courts as in the public interest and which are at 
issue in many reportage cases. Free speech is especially important in this context as the voting public 
in a democracy is entitled to be informed of political disputes, particularly where one of the parties to 
that dispute is standing for election. In Lingens v Austria ,41 the applicant described the Austrian 
Chancellor as a Nazi sympathiser. He argued that his conviction for criminal defamation breached Art 
10(2) of the ECHR and the Strasbourg Court agreed holding that political criticism is an important 
function of the media:  
 
30
 Cases such as Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300; [2002] UKPC 31 assume that this is the case by linking Reynolds v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 to the test of responsible journalism. 
31
 See Barendt, n 20. 
32
 The same would surely apply to tweeters considering in particular the maximum length of a tweet. 
33
 The true impact of qualified privilege on social media remains to be seen. Bloggers cannot sign up to the Draft Royal 
Charter for Proposed Body to Recognise Press Industry Self-Regulator (2013) which begs the question as to whether they 
might need another mechanism: see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249783/Final_Draft_Royal_Charter_11_Oct_20
13.pdf.   
34
 Mitchell P, “The Nature of Responsible Journalism” (2011) 3 Journal of Media Law 19 argues that the standard of 
responsible journalism in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 looks very close to the standard by which breach 
of duty in negligence is judged. Defamation is clearly not a tort of negligence. 
35
 See Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691. 
36
 See Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Bolitho v City of Hackney Health Authority [1998] 
AC 232. 
37
 See Phillips v William Whiteley [1938] 1 All ER 566. 
38
 Assuming that it would be possible to hunt down a blogger. 
39
 Explanatory Notes, Defamation Act 2013 (UK) at [33], http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/notes/contents. 
40
 In Prager & Oberschlick v Austria [1995] ECHR 12 at [34] the Strasbourg Court held that even though the press: “must not 
overstep certain bounds set ... for the protection of the reputation of others, it is ... incumbent upon it to impart – in a way 
consistent with its duties and responsibilities – information and ideas on political questions and other matters in the public 
interest”.  
41
 Lingens v Austria  [1986] ECHR 7. 
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<blockquote> 
Freedom of the press … affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an 
opinion of the ideas and attitudes of political leaders … freedom of political debate is at the very 
core of the concept of a democratic society which prevails throughout the 
Convention.42</blockquote> 
In Roberts v Gable,43 (one of the few cases where reportage was argued successfully), one of the 
parties to the dispute was a potential candidate in the London Mayoral elections. The British National 
Party (BNP) had enjoyed some success in the local elections in 2002 and had put up more candidates. 
The party’s profile had therefore been raised and the electorate had become more interested in their 
affairs.  
There is no particular reason however why reportage should be confined to political disputes but 
those disputes are reported more widely, which might be why most cases cover them. It might also be 
easier to show that the story is in the public interest44 where politics are involved.  
Whilst the basis for responsible journalism involves a consideration of Arts 8 and 10 of the ECHR, 
the question arises as to what further criteria need to be met. This analysis will therefore turn again to 
Lord Nicholls in Bonnick v Morris in order to answer this question.45 
<subdiv>Responsible journalism 
In the words of Lord Nicholls:  
<blockquote> 
Responsible journalism is the point at which a fair balance is held between freedom of expression 
on matters of public concern and the reputation of individuals. Maintenance of this standard is in 
the public interest and in the interest of those whose reputations are involved.46</blockquote> 
The court does not have to determine whether or not it would have acted in the same way as the 
defendant but merely whether the defendant had acted responsibly.47 Allowance is made for editorial 
judgment or discretion and all the circumstances of the case.  
The media are therefore given considerable latitude by the Reynolds defence. The price that 
journalists have to pay however is meeting the standard of responsible journalism.48 For instance, The 
Times in Reynolds failed to argue qualified privilege successfully because they had not reported 
Albert Reynolds’ side of the story.49 In Jameel,50 however, the House of Lords held that it might not 
always be necessary to obtain the claimant’s side of the story and courts should take a more flexible 
 
42
 Lingens v Austria [1986] ECHR 7 at [42]. See Bowman v United Kingdom (1998) 26 EHRR 1; [1998] ECHR 4, where the 
Strasbourg Court held that free elections, freedom of expression and free political debate were the essence of democracy. See 
also Aquilina v Malta  [2011] ECHR 928 at [44], “a constant thread running through the Court’s case law is the insistence on 
the essential role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning of a democratic society”; Print Zeitungsverlag GmbH v 
Austria  [2013] ECHR 943 at [38]-[40]. 
43
 Roberts v Gable [2008] 2 WLR 129; [2007] EWCA Civ 721. 
44
 The term “public interest” is not defined in the Act, so the common law will apply.  
 
46
 Bonnick v Morris [2003] 1 AC 300 at [[23]; [2002] UKPC 31 at [23]; Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) 
[2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 at [57]-[58] (Lords Hoffmann and Scott); Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; 
[2012] UKSC 11 at [123] (Lord Mance). 
47
 Radio France v France (2005) 40 EHRR 29; [2007] ECHR 127 at [39]; Jersild v Denmark (1995) EHRR 1; [1994] ECHR 
33 at [31].  
48
 Eerikainen v Finland [2009] ECHR 255 at [60]. 
49
 See Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11, in particular the judgments of Lords Mance and 
Phillips. 
50
 Kate Beattie describes Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 as having a 
“liberalising intention” in Beattie K, “New Life for Reynolds ‘Public Interest Fence’? Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe” 
(2007) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 81 at 89 but was seen as a worry when drafting the new legislation. 
Sarah Gale* 
©  6 (2015) 23 Tort L Rev 1 
approach to Lord Nicholls’ criteria.51 Section 4 of the Act does not refer to these criteria but does 
make reference to “editorial judgment”,52 an apparent reference to Lord Mance’s judgment in Flood.53 
He distinguishes between whether the story is in the public interest, which is a question of law for the 
judge, and whether or not the defamatory statement should have been included which is a question of 
editorial judgment.54 Judges are not meant to “second guess” editors with the benefit of hindsight for 
fear that this would discourage investigative reporting.55 Arguably the wording of the Act gives 
editors even more discretion, making it even harder for judges to hold that the piece is not privileged. 
This is done under the auspices of promoting freedom of expression56  seeminglyat the expense of 
protecting Art 8 of the ECHR rights.  
It is against this background: the changing face of the law of defamation, taking on board human 
rights’ concerns, and creating the concept of responsible journalism, that the courts have begun to 
develop the defence of “reportage”57 as a sub-species of Reynolds qualified privilege. The essence of 
reportage will be analysed next, starting with the  apparently strict requirement of neutral reporting. 
<DIV>ESSENCE OF REPORTAGE  
The essential characteristics of reportage can been seen in the judgment of Simon Brown LJ on 
appeal in Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd (the first English case to analyse 
reportage):  
<blockquote> 
“Reportage” (a convenient word to describe the neutral reporting of attributed allegations rather 
than their adoption by the newspaper) … should more readily attract qualified privilege than 
publications, as in Reynolds itself, by which the newspaper makes the allegation its own. The 
essential distinction is between … the press’s role as a “watchdog” to report on matters of public 
concern, and its role as “bloodhound” which it pursues by investigative 
journalism.59</blockquote> 
This article will dwell on certain aspects of this quotation as it analyses the two types of qualified 
privilege. It will begin with the issue of neutral reporting; it will then turn to political disputes, and 
 
51
 The quality and reliability of the source was crucial in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; 
[2006] UKHL 44.  
52
 See Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11; Axel Springer AG v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 6; 
[2012] ECHR 227 at [81]. 
53
 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [132]. 
54
 Quoting from Lord Hoffman in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 at 
[51]-[52]. 
55
 Jersild v Denmark (1995) EHRR 1; [1994] ECHR 33 at [31]. 
56
 House of Lords and Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Defamation Bill, HL Paper 84, HC 
810 (December 2012) p 3. 
57
 There are only three substantial academic articles on reportage: see Busuttil G, “Reportage: A Not Entirely Neutral Report” 
(2009) 2 Entertainment Law Review 44; Armstrong N, “The Emerging Defence of Reportage” (2009) 40 Victorian University 
of Wellington Law Review 441; Bosland J, “Republication of Defamation under the Doctrine of Reportage: The Evolution of 
Common Law Qualified Privilege in England and Wales” (2011) 31 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 9.  
59
 Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1634 at [6]. The arguments made by counsel at 
first instance and on appeal are largely responsible for the introduction of reportage into English law. It is assumed that they 
drew on American cases such as Edwards v Aubudon Society, 556 F 2D 113 (NY, 1977) although this is not made clear in the 
reports of Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2000] WL 1675201 (for comment on Edwards, see, eg, 
Bowles D, “Neutral Reportage as a Defence against Republishing Libel” (1989) 11 Communications & Law 3). Other analyses 
of the law in this area in the United States, Canada and Australia include: Laidman D, “When the Slander is the Story: The 
Neutral Reportage Privilege in Theory and Practice” (2010) 17 University of California Los Angeles Entertainment Law 
Review 74; Comment, “Constitutional Law – Freedom of the Press – Pennsylvania Supreme Court Declines to Adopt Neutral 
Reportage Privilege – Norton v Glenn, 860 A 2d 48 (Pa, 2004)” (2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 2029; Donnelly M, “A 
Newsworthiness Privilege for Republished Defamation of Public Figures” (2009) 94 Iowa Law Review 1023; Mullender R, 
“Defamation and Responsible Communication” (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 368; Williams K, “Defaming Politicians: 
The Not so Common Law” (2000) 64 Modern Law Review 748. 
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the public interest followed by the distinction between the press as a “watchdog”60 or “bloodhound”. 
It will also show how difficult it is to argue reportage successfully, mainly because judges have 
limited its scope considerably. Although there is a danger that relying on reportage might result in the 
publication of untrue defamatory material, there is a clear need for a limited form of reportage given 
the difficulties of relying on Reynolds. 
<subdiv>Neutral reporting 
The requirement for neutral reporting is one of the ways in which courtshave limited the scope of 
reportage quite dramatically.61 It is clear from cases such as Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd62 
(where the defendants were found to have drawn certain conclusions about the receipt by Mr 
Galloway of funds diverted from Iraq’s Oil for Food Program even though there was no decisive 
documentary evidence of this) that the defence of reportage will be lost where the defendant asserts 
the allegations directly rather than reporting them as facts. The same would apply in cases such as 
Henry, where Gray J held that the defence of reportage could not succeed because the British 
Broadcasting Corporation had adopted and “embroidered” the conclusions of a report.63 In Malik v 
Newspost Ltd,64 however, the defence could not show that both sides of the controversy had been 
reported in a neutral fashion.65 Similarly in Al-Fagih, Smith J (at first instance) found that the 
reporting could not be seen as either completely fair or accurate as the journalist had tended to favour 
one side of the dispute and had adopted some of the allegations as his own.66 
The case law therefore shows that there is a link between disinterested reporting and giving both sides 
of the story, the core of reportage. Meeting this burden is hard, which is why reportage has only rarely 
succeeded.67 The requirement not to adopt the story as your own tends to limit reportage to a 
particular style of writing. Investigative journalists might be very reluctant to favour this style as there 
is little room for expressing personal opinions. The Reynolds defence would often therefore be more 
appropriate.  
Even though the room for manoeuvre is restricted, when Roberts v United Kingdom68 reached the 
Strasbourg Court, it agreed with the Court of Appeal that although the tone of the article was 
sarcastic, it was as neutral as could be expected of any article written in that particular publication in 
those particular circumstances. A degree of sarcasm if applied to both sides might not therefore be 
fatal to the application of the defence of reportage.  
Although there is some limited scope for manoeuvre if the user is sarcastic, what if he or she is 
malicious in tone? Opinion seems to be divided as to what effect malice might have. Busuttil, for 
example, would seem to disagree with Ward LJ69 in taking the view that Reynolds and reportage are 
“absolute privilege in all but name” and therefore would not be defeated by malice.70 Malice might 
also indicate a lack of neutrality which would surely be fatal to reportage. Malice probably defeats 
reportage and possibly also the Reynolds defence.71 Malice might become an issue as s 4(1)(b) of the 
 
60
 Prager & Oberschlick v Austria [1995] ECHR 12 at [34], courts should be loath to restrict the freedom of the media as it is 
the purveyor of information to the public and acts as a watchdog. 
61
 Neutral reporting is required by Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 4. 
62
 Galloway v Telegraph Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 17. 
63
 See Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 4(2). 
64
 Malik v Newspost Ltd [2007] EWHC 3063. 
65
 See Prince Radu of Hohenzollern v Houston [2008] EWCA Civ 921; [2009] EMLR 839. Justice Eady J Prince Radu of 
Hohenzollern v Houston [2007] EWHC 2735 decided that the report was not neutral enough to be classified as reportage.  
66
 Only Mantell LJ (who dissented) agreed with her on appeal. 
67
 This requirement is largely preserved by the Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 4(3). 
68
 Roberts v United Kingdom [2011] ECHR 1220. 
69
 Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972 at [43]. 
70
 Busuttil, n 57 at 49. 
71
 Malice is irrelevant for the Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127  type of qualified privilege according to Lord 
Hoffman in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 at [46].  Howevernot 
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Act provides that the defendant must “reasonably” believe “that publishing the statement complained 
of was in the public interest”. The word “reasonably” leaves room for debate about malicious intent. 
If reportage cannot cover stories reported in a malicious fashion, is it also limited to certain types of 
dispute?  
<subdiv>Political disputes and public interest  
Nearly all of the reportage cases involved political disputes,72 but it is clear from cases such as Mark v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 1),73 Flood, and Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd75 that 
reportage can extend into other fields. 
Mark did involve a politician, namely the former Prime Minister Tony Blair. However, the newspaper 
dealt with aspects of his private life and particularly the lives of his children. This might not have 
been in the public interest76 for the purpose of Reynolds or reportage. Interest in the private lives of 
famous people is not necessarily in the public interest, even though the public might have a lurid 
fascination in them.77 However, it is possible that this type of story could attract the reportage defence 
albeit in different circumstances.78 
Human rights’ concerns underpin the issue of public interest as well as the question of responsible 
journalism. Indeed there are suggestions in Reynolds that political debate is so fundamental in a 
democratic society that it should not be curtailed unless the means justify the ends.79 Reynolds also 
makes it clear that the defence of qualified privilege will be lost unless the journalist acted 
responsibly.80 This might not include making revelations of a personal nature unless they are in the 
public interest.  
Section 4 of the Act does not define the meaning of public interest and so the courts will draw on the 
existing case law.81 The meaning of the term is similar for Reynolds, reportage, and honest opinion.  
Lord Phillips in Spiller v Joseph82 confirms that whether or not a question is in the public interest or 
not is a matter of law. That case involved a question of whether those entertaining the public could be 
relied upon to perform their contracts or not. The finding by Pill LJ (in the Court of Appeal) that this 
 
according to Lord Phillips MR in Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd [2002] QB 783, although he takes a different view in 
Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [38]. 
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 Ziembinski v Poland [2012] ECHR 1645 at [49] where the court said that the way in which a local government officer carried 
out his official duties would be a matter of public interest. 
73
 Mark v Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 1) [2002] EWCA Civ 772 at [35]. 
75
 Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972. correct 
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as a whole and not upon the effect of the particular defamatory statement which is complained of, which, unless it has no 
contribution to make to the overall effect of the article, should not be isolated for separate consideration”: Flood v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 2375 at [126] (Tugendhat J), upholding Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) 
[2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44. 
77
 Lord Justice Ward describes it as a “legitimate and topical interest” in Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] 
EWCA Civ 972 at [43]; Von Hannover v Germany (No 3) [2013] ECHR 835 at [46], [52], where the court asked whether the 
material contributed to a debate on a matter of public interest.  
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 The requirements that must be met to argue reportage successfully will be analysed later but the defence failed in Mark v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 1) [2002] EWCA Civ 772 because the defendants had not reported contradictory statements in 
a neutral fashion. 
79
 See Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 at 200 (Lord Nicholls); Jersild v Denmark (1995) EHRR 1; [1994] 
ECHR 33 at [31]. 
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 See Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd [2002] QB 783; Kania & Kittel v Poland [2011] ECHR 978 at [49]. 
81
 Lord Mance in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [125] (quoting Lord Scott in Jameel v 
Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2007] 1 AC 359; [2006] UKHL 44 at [128]-[138]) uses the term “real and 
unmistakeable public interest to the public”.  
82Spiller v Joseph [2011] 1 AC 852; [2010] UKSC 53 
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was in the public interest was not challenged on appeal. The concept is therefore a flexible one83 
dependent in part at least on the facts of the case. 
The relationship between public interest and responsible journalism was analysed by Lord Phillips 
MR in the Court of Appeal in Jameel commenting on Eady J at first instance: 
<blockquote> 
We agree ... that the phrase responsible journalism is insufficiently precise to constitute the sole 
test for Reynolds privilege. It denotes the degree of care that a journalist should exercise before 
publishing a defamatory statement. ... The subject matter of the publication must be of such a 
nature that it is in the public interest that it should be published. This is a more stringent test that 
the public should be interested in receiving the information …84</blockquote> 
Lord Mance in Flood takes the view, correctly, that when the House of Lords’ decisions in Reynolds 
and Jameel are read together, the effect is to tilt the balance in favour of greater freedom for the press 
to publish stories in the public interest as against protection of reputation subject of course to meeting 
the burden of responsible journalism.85 Public interest has, however, been defined a little differently 
and rather more narrowly in cases such as Al-Fagih.  
<subdiv>Public Interest in reportage cases 
In Al-Fagih, the defendant’s newspaper sold about 1500 copies a day in London. Its readership 
consisted mainly of members from the Saudi Arabian community with a special interest in both Saudi 
Arabian affairs and Saudi personalities. A split in a political group was of legitimate concern to its 
readers and could therefore be said to be of public interest. Similarly in English v Hastie86 where an 
allegation of inter alia breach of contract and unlawful interference in the business of another firm by 
the managing director and underwriter in a reinsurance firm was published in a monthly subscription 
newsletter that would have been of interest to those involved in the insurance industry in London.  
However, as Eady J pointed out in Roberts v Gable87 at first instance, the case for reportage is 
stronger when it deals with issues of wider political significance.88 Roberts concerned a political 
dispute within the BNP. Even though the issue of public interest is regarded as a question of law for 
the judge for both Reynolds and reportage, it would seem to be very fact dependent and so the value 
of precedent is necessarily somewhat limited. 
Public interest is, of course, not the only issue to be considered in persuading the court that qualified 
privilege should succeed as a defence or in considering the differences between Reynolds and 
reportage. Whilst the concept of public interest and the role it played is, broadly speaking, similar for 
both types of qualified privilege, the key difference relates to how the press operates. Is it operating as 
a watchdog or as a bloodhound?89 
<subdiv>Watchdog/bloodhound 
Where a publication relies on a pure Reynolds defence, then it acts as a bloodhound carrying out a 
lengthy investigation.90 The same cannot be said for reportage where the publication acts more as a 
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 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [68] (Lord Phillips), [177] (Lord Mance).  
84
 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL (No 3) [2005] QB 904; [2005] EWCA Civ 74 at [87]. 
85
 Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11 at [176]. 
86English v Hastie [2002] All ER (D) 11 
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 Roberts v Gable [2006] EWHC 1025 at [35]. Stories of suspected illegality are also likely to be in the public interest, eg, 
Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; [2012] UKSC 11. 
88
 Ziembinski v Poland [2012] ECHR 1645 at [49]. 
89
 Al-Fagih v HH Saudi Research & Marketing (UK) Ltd [2000] WL 1675201 at [6]. A bloodhound sniffs out a story, whereas 
a watchdog barks “to wake us up to a story already out there”: Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972 
at [49] (Ward LJ). 
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 Arguably some of the most famous pieces of investigative journalism include: the breaking of the Watergate scandal by 
Woodward and Bernstein at The Washington Post; The Sunday Times investigation into Thalidomide; The Daily Telegraph 
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watchdog.91 What therefore is meant by investigative journalism? English judges have not attempted 
to define it but it does merit some consideration. 
It was defined by Hugo De Burgh as:  
<blockquote> 
A man or woman whose profession it is to discover the truth and to identify lapses. This is called 
investigative journalism and is distinct from apparently similar work done by the police, lawyers, 
auditors and regulatory bodies in that it is not limited as to target, not legally founded and usually 
earns money for media publishers.93</blockquote> 
Investigative journalism is to be contrasted with tabloid journalism94 where the focus is on 
entertainment rather than: 
<blockquote> 
Informed debate about important issues of public concern … Tabloid journalism conjoins the 
sentimental and the sensational, and the prurient and the populist, often exploiting personal 
tragedy for public spectacle with scandal and sensationalism, often masquerading as “human 
interest”.</blockquote> 
It might be possible, however, for a tabloid paper to engage in investigative journalism.95 
This categorisation matters because the names of contributing journalists are very likely to be credited 
in an investigative piece, as journalists might stake their reputation on the piece. Whereas in reportage 
the journalist’s investigation is rather different as it is much less likely to be originaland it does not 
involve necessarily “breaking” a story as an investigative journalist would. Instead reportage might 
well consist of assembling facts from existing press releases or reports and then extracting the key 
facts and assembling a report covering both sides of the picture.96  
Writers on the other hand such as bloggers, are likely to express their views as there is little point in a 
blogging in a neutral fashion. However, it might be easier and cheaper to argue pure reportage if they 
were to be sued for defamation. Reportage might also play an important role where stories are “re-
tweeted” without being adopted or embellished. However, it would be hard to remain neutral with a 
limit of 140 characters.  
With this in mind, it would seem appropriate to consider and compare the nature of the relationship 
between the two defences further. The article will focus first on whether the journalist needs to 
establish the truth of the story for the defence of reportage to succeed, and then look at the narrow 
scope of reportage in more detail.  
<DIV>RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REYNOLDS AND REPORTAGE – SIMILARITIES AND 
DIFFERENCES  
<subdiv>Verification 
Courts have tended to consider first whether the issue is in the public interest and  have then looked at 
Lord Nicholls’ criteria in Reynolds before deciding whether the journalist has acted responsibly and 
 
investigation into MP’s expenses; and the story by the now defunct News of the World into spot-fixing by players in the 
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 De Burgh H, Investigative Journalism (2nd ed, Routledge, 2008) p 10. See Franklin B, Key Concepts in Journalism Studies 
(Sage Publications, 2005) pp 122-123 for another viewpoint. 
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 Franklin n 91, pp 258-260. 
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 Busuttil, n 57 at 47 suggests that: “The material complained of must be a report … may be distinguished from a piece of 
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whether the public interest is served by publication. Questions about reportage ttend to be argued at 
this stage. For examplein Jameel the issue of whether or not the story was true came up in the context 
of a consideration of the tone of the article (one of Lord Nicholls’ criteria for responsible journalism), 
and Lady Hale said that: 
<blockquote> 
The requirements in “reportage” cases may be different but if the publisher does not himself 
believe the information to be true, he would be well advised to make this clear … the tone in 
which the information is conveyed will be relevant to whether or not the publisher has behaved 
responsibly in passing it on.97</blockquote> 
The publisher does not therefore have to believe in the truth of the story for reportage, because he or 
she is reporting the fact that the allegations have been made98 rather than asserting that they are true. 
For Reynolds, the public interest lies in the fact that the allegations have been made which is why they 
have to be verified. Section 4 of the Act is much broader when it comes to reportage than it is at 
common law. Section 4 could be interpreted as meaning that reportage could be argued successfully 
because of a public interest in the allegations themselves and not on the basis that the allegations have 
been made.99 
the tone of the story is however relevant to both. Reportage cannot succeed where the publisher or 
journalist has adopted or embellished the story, or if there is any lack of neutrality.100 Whereas those 
factors are at the heart of an investigative piece where the journalist adopts the story as his or her own 
and is most unlikely to take an entirely neutral stance.101 
Reportage would usually mean that the author is just reporting the details of the dispute rather than 
asserting its truth. As the story has not been adopted, there is no need for the publisher to assert that it 
is true or even to verify it.102 Indeed Simon Brown LJ in Al-Fagih103 suggests that verification might 
even be inconsistent with objective reporting104 which is at the very heart of reportage.105 However, 
for the Reynolds defence to succeed the journalist or publisher would need to show that they have 
acted responsibly by checking on the accuracy of the story by asking, for example, for the claimant’s 
version of events.106 Seeking out the truth is a crucial part of investigative journalism (the 
bloodhound).  
It is arguable that the judgments of Lords Mance and Phillips in Flood who dealt with the issue of 
verification in some detail, might not make much difference to the current law, even though they 
disagreed with the Court of Appeal in finding that enough had been done to verify the story. Indeed 
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Lord Clarke felt that the case should not be taken as laying down any general principles.108 The 
accusations in Flood were serious as a fairly senior police officer had been accused of taking bribes 
from Russian exiles in exchange for information.109 The Times’ investigation revealed a “strong 
circumstantial”110 case in which all parties had been approached and given a chance to comment. The 
journalists seemed to have been satisfied that Sergeant Flood was likely to be guilty of corruption. 
The Supreme Court found (upholding the judge at first instance) that this was enough to satisfy the 
burden of verification.111 The obligation to verify for Reynolds purposes is therefore very much alive 
although the extent of that obligation seems to be a matter for individual judicial opinion taking into 
account editorial judgement.112  
According to Simon Brown LJ in Al-Fagih, there is another reason why verification might not be 
necessary in reportage cases: 
<blockquote> 
[W]here … both sides to a political dispute are being fully, fairly and disinterestedly reported 
… the public is entitled to be informed of such a dispute without having to wait for the publisher, 
following an attempt at verification, to commit himself to one side or the other.114</blockquote> 
This was important in Al-Fagih where the story was unfolding and being reported upon daily, and all 
the reports would have to be neutral. The related issue of the urgency of the story is also one of Lord 
Nicholls’ criteria for responsible journalism in Reynolds, although that might not be so important for 
reportage.  
In Roberts v United Kingdom, the applicants argued that there was a breach of Art 8 of the ECHR 
because the article had been published without verifying the facts. The Strasbourg Court found no 
breach because although the allegations were serious, it was clear that most readers would see a series 
of allegations and counter-allegations made in the course of a political dispute rather than assertions 
of truth. The article was also published at a time of heightened interest in the BNP and was therefore 
in the public interest. There would need to be very good reasons for “punishing” the journalist for 
writing about the dispute.115 
Whilst Reynolds and reportage have much in common, the scope of reportage is undoubtedly more 
restricted both at common law and under the Act. 
<subdiv>Narrow scope of reportage 
There is undoubtedly a close link between the Reynolds type of qualified privilege which is sui 
generis and covers media publications and reportage.116 The emphasis in the case law on Reynolds is 
on promoting freedom of expression provided that the investigative journalist meets the standard of 
responsible journalism. The same can be said of reportage, at least to some extent.117 For instance, 
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reportage does not seem to require the same investigative methods nor does the piece need to be 
original. The analogy drawn above between the watchdog and bloodhound seems most appropriate118 
as analysed by counsel for the appellant in Al-Fagih: 
<blockquote> 
the newspaper’s role was essentially that of reporter … rather than that of an investigator 
exploring the actual facts and reporting the outcome of such investigations …119</blockquote> 
The focus for reportage is on reporting the facts rather than analysing the story.120 Whereas the public 
interest in Reynolds lies in the allegations themselves which is why there is an obligation to verify. 
Reportage is therefore a type of Reynolds qualified privilege covering very limited situations.121 The 
courts apply the tests for reportage fairly strictly so that where the story has been adopted or 
embellished, the journalist will not be able to rely on reportage although Reynolds or other defences 
such as truth122 might still be available. There is room in the English law of defamation for the 
defence of reportage in view of the cost and difficulty of mounting a Reynolds defence. The existence 
of the reportage defence also acknowledges that there are different styles of reporting. Assuming that 
a blogger wanted to write a neutral report, then it would be theoretically possible to argue reportage 
or knowing that such a report could be defended more easily than arguing Reynolds. Perhaps Busuttil 
summarises it best: 
<blockquote> 
To justify the attack on the claimant’s reputation the publication must always meet the standards 
of responsible journalism … All the circumstances of the case and the 10 factors listed by Lord 
Nicholls adjusted as may be necessary for the special nature of reportage must be considered ... to 
reach the necessary conclusion that this is the product of responsible journalism.123</blockquote> 
The relationship between Reynolds and reportage is largely fluid and the Reynolds factors will be 
applied differently depending on the circumstances of the particular case. The Act would seem to 
encourage the flexible application of the Reynolds criteria as seen in Jameel. 
<DIV>DEFAMATION ACT 2013 (UK) IN MORE DETAIL 
The Act124 came into force on 1 January 2014 and is intended to create “a more balanced and fair 
law”.125 Section 1 provides that all claimants should show that the publication has caused or is likely 
to cause serious harm.126 Whilst the meaning of what is defamatory has not changed,127 the threshold 
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has been raised. This is intended to build upon cases such as Thornton v Telegraph Media Group 
Ltd128 which established a threshold of seriousness. It should prevent frivolous claims rather than 
publications causing minimal damage. Indeed in Dow Jones v Jameel,129 the Court of Appeal 
suggested that cases could be struck out as an abuse of process where minimal or no actual damage 
had been sustained, although that is likely to be rare.130 Proving seriousness might however be costly 
as witnesses will have to testify, although it would be unusual for a claim to be brought where 
damage to reputation is minimal. 
The Act rewrites the law in s 4 by abolishing references to Lord Nicholls’ criteria in Reynolds that 
had appeared in earlier versions of the Bill, by creating a new defence entitled “publication on a 
matter of public interest” covering both the former Reynolds qualified privilege and reportage, 
thereby confirming their close relationship. This change is intended to free judges from the stricture 
of Lord Nicholls’ criteria allowing them to apply the judgments in Jameel and Flood. However, 
judges might be tempted to fall back on some or even all of the criteria as s 4(2) allows the court to 
look at “all the circumstances of the case”. 
Courts are likely to refer, amongst other things, to the size and resources of the defendant publication. 
Does this mean that there will be a sliding scale with large media organisations being judged by one 
standard and bloggers being judged by a lesser standard? This cannot be what Lord Nicholls 
envisaged for his responsible journalism test and runs contrary to the analogy with breach of duty in 
negligence drawn above. A sliding scale of objectivity would surely be a very difficult one to apply. 
Arguably bloggers and others with limited resources should not publish potentially defamatory 
material if they do not have the resources to defend a claim. Will it be easier for bloggers to satisfy 
this requirement? As the common law was designed around Reynolds and investigative journalism, 
judges will have to make considerable adjustments.  
The Act deliberately does not attempt to define what is meant by “the public interest” and nor do the 
Explanatory Notes. Its meaning is imprecise leaving judges with a wide-ranging discretion over how 
to define it. A tighter definition would have been preferable. Section 4(1) does, however, enable 
judges to adapt the guidance given by case law to the facts before them. Although it is a question of 
law, the role of precedent is likely to be limited as the term “public interest” is likely to continue be 
pretty fact-specific. 
The Act adds in a further complication by providing that not only does the statement have to be in the 
public interest but that the defendant “reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained 
of was in the public interest”. The second hurdle requires a subjective evaluation which is new and 
will surely involve a consideration of whether or not malice was involved. There is also the potential 
for the claimant to dig into the defendant’s motives making litigation more complex.131  
The House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights took the view that 
this section132 was ECHR-compliant because courts would still look at the Reynolds criteria when 
assessing whether a journalist held a reasonable belief but without following the criteria rigidly. 
Courts will need to look at what steps were taken to verify the truth of the statement and whether 
adequate investigation had been carried out. The appropriate balance between Arts 8 and 10 of the 
ECHR will have to be struck and lack of verification and consultation of reliable sources, particularly 
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where the allegations are serious, would be likely to breach Art 8.133 Questions remain as to whether 
the legislation strikes the right balance or tilts too far towards Art 10.134 
Section 4(3) relates to reportage, by specifically drawing a distinction between the two types of 
qualified privilege on the key issue of verification; confirming that whilst failure to verify is not 
crucial to reportage, it might be important in establishing the former Reynolds defence.135 Section 4(5) 
makes it clear that the defence of reportage could apply to statements of fact or opinion.136 Expressing 
opinions can be a tricky issue for reportage because there is a risk of lack of neutrality.  
The big problem with s 4(3) is that it does not reflect the case law analysed in this article. As 
mentioned earlier, the Act does not pick up one of the key features of reportage which is: “It is not the 
content of a reported allegation that is of public interest but the fact that the allegation has been 
made.”137 
This restriction limited the defence. There is every reason to suspect that the defence will be much 
broader as the courts might find that the defence applies on the basis of the public interest in the 
allegations themselves and not the fact that they had been made. This author was in favour of a more 
limited form of reportage and feels that the wider form is much harder to defend. Has the pendulum 
swung too much in favour of Art 10 of the ECHR, although human rights’ concerns and case law 
might persuade courts to stick to the existing case law? However, the reportage defence in the Act is 
more limited because the claimant must be a party to the dispute. This limitation is apparently 
intended to ensure that he or she can put forward his or her side of the story and explain why the other 
party to the dispute was wrong. This explanation is entirely unconvincing.138 
Section 4(4) provides that the court “must make allowance for editorial judgement as it considers 
appropriate”. This is in keeping with cases from the Strasbourg Court, such as Jersild,139 where the 
court held that it is not for national courts: “To substitute their own views for those of the press as to 
what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists.” This seems designed to deal with one 
of the criticisms of Reynolds, namely that the judge was effectively put into the editor’s chair.140 
Lord Dyson in Flood states that: “Weight should be given to a newspaper’s editorial judgement as to 
what details are necessary to convey the essential message.The court should be slow to interfere with 
an exercise of editorial judgement.”141 His Lordship also suggests that a story could still be in the 
public interest even if the journalist had a “personal vendetta” against the subject of the story.  
Journalists are not therefore restricted by a set of guidelines limiting what can and cannot be 
published. Lord Nicholls’ criteria should no longer be seen as hurdles but as a guide to reaching 
appropriate editorial decisions.  
The Explanatory Notes suggest that reference to “editorial judgement” goes beyond “editors in the 
media context”.142 This would involve a radical change to most of the common law which covered 
investigative journalism. Reynolds was designed with that in mind and this radical rethink would 
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controversially judge a large media organisation and a small journal or a blogger by the same 
standards. 
The Act should therefore be seen as a significant development for several reasons. First, because it 
would seem to reaffirm that reportage is indeed a sub-species of the Reynolds form of qualified 
privilege. Secondly, it confirms that failure to verify the accuracy of the story will not destroy the 
reportage defence. Thirdly, s 4 of the Act seems to assume that public interest is given the same 
meaning for both the Reynolds defence and for reportage. Fourthly, the flexibility given to journalists 
by the concept of “editorial judgment” is codified. Finally, journalists are freed from the strictures of 
Lord Nicholls’ criteria.  
<DIV>CONCLUSION 
Reportage is clearly part of the landscape now that it has found its way into the Act, although it is 
regrettable that the wording of the statute does not reflect the common law. At common law it was not 
the content of the story but the fact that the allegations had been made which was in the public 
interest, but it is hoped that judges continue to take a narrow view of reportage nevertheless. It 
remains to be seen whether the fact that the claimant must be party to the dispute proves to be a major 
limiting factor. A wider defence might risk tilting the balance too far in favour of Art 10 of the ECHR 
and allowing for the potentially widespread reporting of unverified defamatory statements.  
Judges will probably continue to refer to Lord Nicholls’ guidelines despite their absence from the 
Act. The codification of Flood is meant to encourage judges not to “second guess” editors and surely 
gives even greater prominence to freedom of expression. How important the subjective view of the 
public interest in s 4(1)(b) of the Act will be and what influence arguments over malice will have is 
an open question. Malice has always been hard to prove and there is no reason to suspect that will 
change. 
Whilst Reynolds was designed to deal with investigative journalism, the new public interest defence 
seemingly applies more broadly. Quite how smaller publications or bloggers will fund the running of 
their defence is unclear. One wonders also how courts will judge a large media organisation, a small 
journal, blogger or tweeter by the same exacting standard. Finding objectivity across the board is 
surely impossible. 
 
Postscript: in Cooke v MGN [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB) it was held that “serious” for the purposes of s. 
1 of the Act should have its every day meaning. Bean J said in some cases there might be no need to 
produce evidence of serious harm although he declined to say how seriousness might be proved. 
More recently it was held in Ames v The Spamhaus Project Limited [2015] EWHC 127 (QB) at [53] 
that “likely” in s. 1 meant “more probable than not”. Warby J also drew an analogy between “serious 
harm” and the concept of “a real and substantial tort” for jurisdictional purposes. He suggested that 
judges should look at: “the nature of the statement…, the gravity of its meaning, and the nature and 
extent of its publication..” at [45].  He also warned against attempts to rely on an inference of 
seriousness. It is therefore clear that s. 1 will need further interpretation by the courts as the cases 
have not been as clear or consistent as we might have hoped especially on the key point of what 
evidence needs to be adduced to prove seriousness. 
